

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1051

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1945

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PEPR, TU, GR, CY  
SUBJ: TURKISH VIEW OF MONTREUX SUMMIT

1. I SOUGHT AN APPOINTMENT WITH MFA SEC GEN ELEKDAG AFTERNOON MARCH 14 TO ASK FOR A DEBRIEFING ON MONTREUX SUMMIT AND TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-TURKISH RELATIONS. LATTER SUBJECT WILL BE DEALT WITH IN SEPTEL.

2. ELEKDAG, WHO SAT IN AS NOTETAKER DURING ALL SESSIONS AT MONTREUX EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF SATURDAY MORNING MEETING, SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUMMIT AND ITS OUTCOME WERE FAR BETTER THAN SUGGESTED BY THE BLAND COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THE TURKISH ASSESSMENT WAS THAT A TRULY FIENDLY, OPEN-HEARTED, AND SINCERE DIALOGUE HAD TAKEN PLACE.

3. THE ONLY CONCRETE RESULT OF THE MEETING WAS A DECISION TO MEET AGAIN. IN THE MEANTIME CONTACT WAS TO BE MAINTAINED BY HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES WHO WOULD MEET IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A FUTURE MEETING, THE DATE OF WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SET BUT "WILL NOT BE TOO FAR IN THE FUTURE."

4. ELEKDAG SAID CARAMANLIS' GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MEETING HAD BEEN ONE OF CAUTION. HE HAD MADE CLEAR

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THAT HE BELIEVED THE MANNER IN WHICH SOLUTIONS WERE FOUND WAS AS IMPORTANT AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THOSE SOLUTIONS. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BECAUSE THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD NOT PERMIT IT. ECEVIT AGREED BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD WORK TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO

IMPROVE THAT CLIMATE.

5. ELEKDAG SAID THE BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE DISCUSSED ONE BY ONE AND IN GREAT DETAIL. THE CYPRUS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. ACCORDING TO ELEKDAG, ECEVIT TIME AFTER TIME ATTEMPTED TO ENTER INTO A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BUT CARAMANLIS REBUFFED HIM SAYING THAT IN THE GREEK VIEW, CYPRUS IS NOT A BILATERAL PROBLEM, IT IS A SEPARATE INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, AND EVEN IF GREECE AND TURKEY SHOULD AGREE ON A SOLUTION IT COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. CARAMANLIS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT BOTH SIDES COULD CONTINUE TO GIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ADVICE TO THE LEADERS OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK COMMUNITIES ON CYPRUS. ECEVIT RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT ALL FOUR PARTIES NEEDED TO TAKE SOME POLITICAL RISKS AND SHOULD TRY TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME BEFORE THE SITUATION BECAME TOO RIGID. ECEVIT ENCOURAGED CARAMANLIS TO MAKE SURE THE GREEK-CYPRIOIS RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIS PROPOSALS. CARAMANLIS SAID THAT HIS INFLUENCE WAS LIMITED BUT HE COULD GIVE ADVICE. HE, IN TURN, ENCOURAGED ECEVIT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY DENKTASH WERE FORTH-COMING.

6. ELEKDAG SAID THAT AT ONE POINT ECEVIT OPENED A MAP  
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IN ORDER TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE AREAS OF TERRITORIAL READJUSTMENT. CARAMANLIS REFUSED TO DISCUSS DETAILS HOWEVER. DURING THE DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE, ECEVIT SUGGESTED THAT IT CONTAIN AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND A REAFFIRMATION OF TURKISH AND GREEK SUPPORT FOR THE MAKARIOS-DENKTASH AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 1977. CARAMANLIS AGREED TO THE FIRST SUGGESTION BUT NOT THE SECOND SAYING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOIS PROPOSALS ARE REASONABLE, KYPRIANOU WOULD NOT EVADE DISCUSSION.

7. CONCERNING THE AEGEAN AIR SPACE ISSUE, ECEVIT COMPLAINED THAT THE GREEKS WERE TRYING TO TURN THE FIR INTO AN EXPRESSION OF SOVEREIGNTY. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE 3,000 SQUARE MILE AIR CONTROL ZONE AROUND THE ISLAND OF LIMNOS AND THE GREEK CLAIM OF TEN MILES OF AIR SPACE VIOLATED THE CHICAGO CONVENTION.

8. CARAMANLIS RESPONDED BY COMPLAINING ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PREVIOUS TRUKISH GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT SEVERAL TIMES THE TWO SIDES HAD BEEN NEAR AGREE-

MENT BUT THE TURKS HAD BACKED AWAY. ON THE QUESTION OF LIMNOS, HE SAID GREECE WAS WRONG AND THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CORRECTED. WITH RESPECT TO THE TEN MILE AIR SPACE CLAIM, HE POINTED OUT THAT GREECE HAD FIRST EXTENDED ITS AIR SPACE TO TEN MILES IN 1931 AND THAT TURKEY HAD NOT PROTESTED UNTIL RECENTLY.

9. ELEKDAG SAID THAT THE GOT HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT CARAMANLIS WAS SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE ON THE AIR SPACE ISSUE BUT HE HAD SAID HE WAS NOT IN THE POSITION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AT MONTREUX.

10. CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE GRKKE ISLANDS IN THE AEGEAN, CARAMANLIS SAID THE GOG WAS "PARTIALLY" VIOLATING  
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE RECORD OF MEETING OF A SUBCOMMITTEE AT LAUSANNE INDICATED THAT WHILE THE ISLANDS WERE TO BE DEMILITARIZED, THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF FORBIDDING THEIR BEING DEFENDED FROM A THREAT. IN RESPONSE, ECEVIT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GREEKS HAD CERTAIN APPREHENSIONS ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS IN THE AEGEAN. THE GOT HAS NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. IN FACT, THE GOT BELIEVES THAT THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS MUST BE DISSOCIATED FROM THE CONTINENTAL SHELF QUESTION COMPLETELY. NEITHER SHOULD INFLUENCE THE OTHER.

11. ECEVIT SAID THAT JUST AS GREECE HAD CERTAIN APPREHENSIONS ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS, TURKEY HAS CERTAIN APPREHENSIONS ABOUT GREEK INTENTIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE EXPANSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE AEGEAN TO TWELVE MILES. SUCH AN ACTION BY GREECE WOULD STRANGLE TURKEY AND WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE. TURKEY VIEWS THE GREEK CLAIM TO A TEN MILE AIR SPACE AS AN INDICATION OF A GREEK DESIRE FOR AN EXPANDED TERRITORIAL SEA. CARAMANLIS SAID THAT GREECE HAS NO INTENTION OF EXPANDING ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO TWELVE MILES AND WILL NOT DO SO. IN RESPONSE, ECEVIT SAID THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTED TO HEAR AND FOR HIS PART, HE COULD ASSURE CARAMANLIS THAT TURKEY HAS NO INTENTION OF SEEKING A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.

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12. ECEVIT SUGGESTED THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO ISSUES BE MADE PUBLIC. CARAMANLIS SAID HE COULD NOT BECAUSE HE WOULD BE ACCUSED OF SELLING OUT GREEK INTERESTS. MOREOVER, HE ARGUED, SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN FACT INVOLVED A GREEK CONCESSION WITHOUT ANY TURKISH COUNTER-CONCESSION SINCE GREECE WOULD BE CONCEDING THE PROSPECT OF EXTENDING ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS WHILE RECEIVING IN RETURN ONLY THE TURKISH ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD NOT CHALLENGE THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.

13. ECEVIT SUGGESTED THAT HE AND CARAMANLIS TRY TO WORK OUT POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE TECHNICAL LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF ISSUE, CARAMANLIS EVADED THE SUGGESTION BUT DID NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY. HE MADE THE POINT, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE END THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED TO BE ABLE TO PORTRAY ANY AGREEMENT AS HAVING COME FROM A THIRD PARTY, IE, THE ICJ OR SOME OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION. ELEKDAG SAID ECEVIT HAD NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED THE DOOR ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

14. I ASKED ABOUT ECEVIT'S IMPRESSION OF CARAMANLIS. ELEKDAG SAID ECEVIT BELIEVES THAT CARAMANLIS IS "NOT A CHEAP POLITICIAN", THAT HE INSPIRES TRUST AND CONFIDENCE,  
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AND THAT HE IS INTERESTED IN AND WILLING TO DO SOME THINGS TO IMPROVE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. ECEVIT SAID THAT CARAMANLIS CLAIMS TO BE WILLING TO TAKE POLITICAL RISKS BUT APPEARED TO BE RELUCTANT TO DO SO. CARAMANLIS CAME TO MONTREUX HAVING BEEN ADVISED TO "HOLD

THE LINE." AT FUTURE MEETINGS, HOWEVER, ECEVIT BELIEVES CARAMANLIS MAY IN FACT BE WILLING TO ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

15. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS THAT DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO WERE PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY SUBSTANTIAL RESULT OF THE FIRST MEETING AND I WONDERED IF ELEKDAG HAD ANY FEELING FOR HOW CARAMANLIS VIEWED ECEVIT. ELEKDAG SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT CARAMANLIS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ECEVIT WAS IN CHARGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, THAT HE KNOWS THE ISSUES, AND THAT HE IS VERY EFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING THE TURKISH VIEW.

16. ELEKDAG RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE THEME THAT CARAMANLIS WAS LABORING UNDER THE BURDEN OF "NEGATIVE ADVICE." HE SAID THE GREEK ATTITUDE IS CONTRADICTORY. THE GREEKS TELL THEIR ALLIES THAT THEY WANT TO RETURN TO FULL PARTICIPATION IN NATO. THEY SAY THAT THE CYPRUS QUESTION MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST. BUT THEN THEY REFUSE TO DISCUSS CYPRUS. ANOTHER CONTRADICTION, ELEKDAG SAID, IS THAT THE GREEKS CLAIM TO SEE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO AND TURKEY, BUT THEY CONTINUE TO ALLOW THE WHIMS OF A THIRD PARTY (CYPRUS) TO CONTROL THOSE RELATIONSHIPS.

17. LATER, AFTER AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF US-TURKISH  
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RELATIONS, ELEKDAG RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE MONTREUX SUMMIT. HE SAID HE HAD LEFT MONTREUX WITH THE CONVICTION THAT CARAMANLIS WOULD LIKE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY. CARAMANLIS RECOGNIZES THAT HIS MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONING OF HIS NATION. MOREOVER, HE IS SURROUNDED BY ADVISORS WHO TELL HIM "TURKEY IS CORNERED, DON'T MAKE A MOVE; SMILE BUT DO NOT MOVE." THIS ADVICE DOES NOT FALL ON TOTALLY DEAF EARS. FOR THIS REASON AS LONG AS THE US ARMS EMBARGO CONTINUES CARAMANLIS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BE FLEXIBLE.

18. ELEKDAG SAID THAT CARAMANLIS HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THAT NO NOTES BE TAKEN DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. NEVERTHELESS, ELEKDAG HAD TAKEN NOTES AND CARAMANLIS DID NOT OBJECT. HE HAD ASKED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BE GIVEN A COPY OF THE NOTES. ELEKDAG SAID THE NOTES WOULD BE CLOSELY HELD AND WOULD ONLY BE UTILIZED AS MEMORY AIDS BY THE PRIME MINISTERS. HE ASKED THAT THE INFORMATION HE HAD GIVEN ME NOT BE SHARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT WE

NOT LET THE GREEKS KNOW WE HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE MEETING BY THE TURKS. THAT IS WHY I HAVE CLASSIFIED THIS NODIS.

19. COMMENT: ELEKDAG MADE AN EFFORT TO INTERPRET THE MONTREUX SUMMIT POSITIVELY, AND IN FACT I BELIEVE TURKS' MINIMUM EXPECTATIONS WERE MET. THE SUMMIT OCCURRED, THE TURKS GET CREDIT FOR THE INITIATIVE, ECEVIT AND CARAMANLIS ESTABLISHED THE BEGINNINGS OF A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP, AND AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. THE TURKS ARE ALREADY DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, BY CARAMANLIS' RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY TEND NOT TO BLAME HIM FOR THIS BUT RATHER HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS, NEGATIVE ADVISORS AND US ACTIONS. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT BEFORE, ECEVIT NEEDS AN EARLY FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS AND HE HAD HOPED THE SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE IT. IT  
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HAS NOT DONE SO DIRECTLY, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT THE CHARGE THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL HAD WE NOT "INTERFERED" WILL EVOKE SUCH A POPULAR RESPONSE, THAT ECEVIT WILL BE TEMPTED TO USE AN EMOTIONAL DISPLAY OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS.  
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## Message Attributes

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